RESUMEN
The need for well-controlled clinical trials is fundamental to advancing medicine. Care should be taken to maintain high standards in trial design and conduct even during emergency medical events such as an infectious disease outbreak. In 2020, SARS-CoV-2 emerged and rapidly impacted populations around the globe. The need for effective therapeutics was immediately evident, prompting the National Institutes of Health to initiate the Adaptive COVID-19 Treatment Trial. The Special Pathogens Research Network, made up of 10 Regional Emerging Special Pathogens Treatment Centers, was approached to participate in this trial and readily joined the trial on short notice. By trial closure, the Special Pathogens Research Network sites, making up 19% of all study sites, enrolled 26% of the total participants. The initial resources available and experience in running clinical trials at each treatment center varied from minimal experience and few staff to extensive experience and a large staff. Based on experiences during the first phase of this trial, the Special Pathogens Research Network members provided feedback regarding operational lessons learned and recommendations for conducting future studies during a pandemic. Communication, collaboration, information technology, regulatory processes, and access to resources were identified as important topics to address. Key stakeholders including institutions, institutional review boards, and study personnel must maintain routine communication to efficiently and effectively activate when future research needs arise. Regular and standardized training for new personnel will aid in transitions and project continuity, especially in a rapidly evolving environment. Trainings should include local just-in-time training for new staff and sponsor-designed modules to refresh current staff knowledge. We offer recommendations that can be used by institutions and sponsors to determine goals and needs when preparing to set up this type of trial for critical, short-notice needs.
Asunto(s)
Tratamiento Farmacológico de COVID-19 , Humanos , National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (U.S.) , Pandemias/prevención & control , SARS-CoV-2 , Estados UnidosRESUMEN
Loved and hated, NIAID's chief plots life after government.
Asunto(s)
Enfermedades Transmisibles , National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (U.S.) , Vacunas , Enfermedades Transmisibles/historia , Gobierno , Odio , Historia del Siglo XX , Historia del Siglo XXI , Estados Unidos , Vacunas/historiaRESUMEN
The global emergence of many severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) variants jeopardizes the protective antiviral immunity induced after infection or vaccination. To address the public health threat caused by the increasing SARS-CoV-2 genomic diversity, the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases within the National Institutes of Health established the SARS-CoV-2 Assessment of Viral Evolution (SAVE) programme. This effort was designed to provide a real-time risk assessment of SARS-CoV-2 variants that could potentially affect the transmission, virulence, and resistance to infection- and vaccine-induced immunity. The SAVE programme is a critical data-generating component of the US Government SARS-CoV-2 Interagency Group to assess implications of SARS-CoV-2 variants on diagnostics, vaccines and therapeutics, and for communicating public health risk. Here we describe the coordinated approach used to identify and curate data about emerging variants, their impact on immunity and effects on vaccine protection using animal models. We report the development of reagents, methodologies, models and notable findings facilitated by this collaborative approach and identify future challenges. This programme is a template for the response to rapidly evolving pathogens with pandemic potential by monitoring viral evolution in the human population to identify variants that could reduce the effectiveness of countermeasures.
Asunto(s)
COVID-19 , SARS-CoV-2 , Animales , Evolución Biológica , Vacunas contra la COVID-19 , Humanos , National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (U.S.) , Pandemias/prevención & control , Variantes Farmacogenómicas , SARS-CoV-2/genética , SARS-CoV-2/patogenicidad , Estados Unidos/epidemiología , VirulenciaAsunto(s)
Sistemas de Registro de Reacción Adversa a Medicamentos , Vacunas contra la COVID-19/efectos adversos , Vacunas contra la COVID-19/inmunología , COVID-19/inmunología , Anafilaxia/epidemiología , Anafilaxia/etiología , COVID-19/prevención & control , Vacunas contra la COVID-19/administración & dosificación , Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, U.S. , China , Industria Farmacéutica , Estudios de Seguimiento , Humanos , Inmunización Secundaria/efectos adversos , Aplicaciones Móviles , National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (U.S.) , Polietilenglicoles/administración & dosificación , Polietilenglicoles/efectos adversos , Federación de Rusia , Autoinforme , Teléfono Inteligente , Reino Unido , Estados UnidosAsunto(s)
COVID-19/epidemiología , Ciencia , Animales , Regiones Árticas , COVID-19/diagnóstico , COVID-19/prevención & control , COVID-19/virología , Vacunas contra la COVID-19/normas , Vacunas contra la COVID-19/provisión & distribución , China/epidemiología , Dengue/prevención & control , Dengue/transmisión , Expediciones , Salud Global , Secuenciación de Nucleótidos de Alto Rendimiento , Humanos , Indonesia/epidemiología , Difusión de la Información , Mosquitos Vectores/microbiología , National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (U.S.)/organización & administración , Nueva Zelanda/epidemiología , Física , Política , Racismo/prevención & control , Seguridad , Sexismo/prevención & control , Estados Unidos/epidemiología , Uruguay/epidemiología , Organización Mundial de la Salud/economía , Organización Mundial de la Salud/organización & administraciónAsunto(s)
Infecciones por Coronavirus/epidemiología , Infecciones por Coronavirus/prevención & control , Pandemias/prevención & control , Neumonía Viral/epidemiología , Neumonía Viral/prevención & control , Política , COVID-19 , Humanos , National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (U.S.) , Estados Unidos/epidemiologíaAsunto(s)
Adenosina Monofosfato/análogos & derivados , Alanina/análogos & derivados , Antivirales/uso terapéutico , Betacoronavirus , Infecciones por Coronavirus/tratamiento farmacológico , Drogas en Investigación/uso terapéutico , Neumonía Viral/tratamiento farmacológico , Adenosina Monofosfato/efectos adversos , Adenosina Monofosfato/economía , Adenosina Monofosfato/provisión & distribución , Adenosina Monofosfato/uso terapéutico , Alanina/efectos adversos , Alanina/economía , Alanina/provisión & distribución , Alanina/uso terapéutico , Antivirales/efectos adversos , Antivirales/economía , Antivirales/provisión & distribución , COVID-19 , Ensayos Clínicos Fase III como Asunto , Infecciones por Coronavirus/epidemiología , Aprobación de Drogas , Costos de los Medicamentos , Drogas en Investigación/efectos adversos , Drogas en Investigación/economía , Drogas en Investigación/provisión & distribución , Fiebre Hemorrágica Ebola/tratamiento farmacológico , Humanos , Tiempo de Internación , National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (U.S.) , Pandemias , Neumonía Viral/epidemiología , Sistema de Registros , SARS-CoV-2 , Resultado del Tratamiento , Estados Unidos/epidemiología , Tratamiento Farmacológico de COVID-19RESUMEN
BACKGROUND: The Centers of Excellence for Influenza Research and Surveillance (CEIRS) network, funded by the US National Institutes of Health, has been operational since 2007 and is tasked with conducting research to improve understanding of influenza viruses. Recently, CEIRS developed an Influenza Response Plan (IRP) to improve science preparedness for the network. METHODS: Development of the IRP involved a collaborative process between project staff, CEIRS center directors or their designees, and NIAID CEIRS leadership (referred to as the Pandemic Planning Advisory Committee [PPAC]). Project staff identified and summarized the response capabilities of each center and then worked with the PPAC to identify and rank research priorities for an emergency response using a modified Delphi method. RESULTS: Key elements of the response plan include tables of response capabilities for each CEIRS center, a framework that outlines and ranks research priorities for CEIRS during an emergency situation, and an operational strategy for executing the research priorities. CONCLUSIONS: The CEIRS IRP highlights the importance of enhancing science preparedness in advance of an influenza pandemic or other influenza-related zoonotic incident to ensure that research can be carried out expeditiously and effectively in emergency situations and to improve global health security.